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Abstract: For Kant, the human cognitive faculty has two sub-faculties: sensibility 
and the understanding. Each has pure forms which are necessary to us as humans: 
space and time for sensibility; the categories for the understanding. But Kant is 
careful to leave open the possibility of there being creatures like us, with both 
sensibility and understanding, who nevertheless have different pure forms of 
sensibility. They would be finite rational beings and discursive cognizers. But they 
would not be human. And this raises a question about the pure forms of the 
understanding. Does Kant leave open the possibility of discursive cognizers who have 
different categories? Even if other discursive cognizers might not sense like us, must 
they at least think like us? We argue that textual and systematic considerations do 
not determine the answers to these questions and examine whether Kant thinks that 
the issue cannot be decided. Consideration of his wider views on the nature and 
limits of our knowledge of mind shows that Kant could indeed remain neutral on 
the issue but that the exact form his neutrality can take is subject to unexpected 
constraints. The result would be an important difference between what Kant says 
about discursive cognizers with other forms of sensibility and what he is in a position 
to say about discursive cognizers with other forms of understanding. Kantian 






“Thus here is a case where the common saying holds, 
that no answer is an answer” (A/B)  1 
 
. Introduction 
The Critique of Pure Reason aims to explain the possibility of synthetic a priori 
judgment. Kant’s explanation of this possibility involves certain claims about 
the structure of the mind. This much is straightforward. As too is the general 
shape of his explanation. It rests on the fact that there are two faculties to the 
cognitive mind, a passive faculty of sensibility and an active faculty of the 
understanding. Each has its own representations by means of which we relate 
to objects. Sensibility gives us objects by means of intuitions; we think of 
objects by means of concepts. Kant’s explanation of the possibility of synthetic 
a priori judgment turns on the claim that each of these faculties has its own a 
priori elements. Sensibility has pure intuitions, space and time; the 
understanding has pure concepts, the categories. It is these a priori elements 
to sensibility and the understanding—their pure forms—which explain that 
which Kant takes to require explanation. 
So far, so good. But Kant is careful to limit his claims about space and time 
to human sensibility. He is careful to leave open the possibility of creatures 
like us, with both sensibility and understanding, who nevertheless have 
different pure forms of sensibility. They would be finite rational beings and 
discursive cognizers. But they would not be human. And this raises a question 
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about the a priori element to the understanding. Does Kant likewise limit his 
claims about the categories to human understanding? Specifically, does he 
leave open the possibility of discursive cognizers—cognizers with both 
sensibility and understanding, i.e. with sensibly conditioned intellects—who 
nevertheless have different intellectual forms from our own? These are the 
questions that we shall pursue in this essay. 
Their answers matter. Kant takes the world, in some sense, to depend on us, 
in some sense. But who is that ‘us’ on which the world depends? How much 
of our cognitive engagement with the world is shaped by our human nature, 
and how much by our discursive nature more generally? These questions get 
to the heart of the role humanity plays in Kant’s Critical philosophy. Many 
of Kant’s readers have taken him to be the great humanizing philosopher of 
the modern period. All of the questions of philosophy, he tells us, are 
contained within the question “What is the human being?” (JL:), and the 
Copernican turn looks to put human beings at the centre of knowledge and 
reality. Others have taken Kant’s commitment to a truly transcendental 
philosophy to require a withdrawal from the level of the human being to 
something more universal.2 The answers to our questions bear on these deeper 
issues. 
Our aim in this essay is to make our questions precise and to show the 
difficulty in answering them. We proceed as follows. In §§– we examine 
Kant’s claims about the possibility of discursive cognizers with other sensible 
forms and formulate structurally analogous and disanalogous claims about 
other intellectual forms. The result is a clear statement of two opposing 
positions which one might attribute to Kant. One holds that Kant leaves open 
the possibility of discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms; the other 
holds that Kant rules out such a possibility. In §§– we examine a number 
of textual and systematic considerations and argue that they do not settle the 
question of which view Kant endorses. The apparent inability of the textual 
and systematic considerations to settle our debate opens up an intriguing 
possibility: that Kant is neutral on the issue. We explore this option in §§–
. It indicates what would be an important asymmetry between Kant’s 
treatment of sensible and intellectual forms. For in the case of discursive 
 




cognizers with other sensible forms, Kant thinks we cannot know whether 
such beings are possible. But neutrality here would involve the second-order 
claim that we cannot know whether we can know whether discursive cognizers 
with other intellectual forms are possible. In § we argue that such a view is 
compatible with Kant’s commitment to decidability in transcendental 
philosophy. In § we argue that the exact form such neutrality can take is 
nevertheless constrained by Kant’s commitment to a kind of luminosity 
principle. To put it somewhat provocatively, neutrality demands silence.  
. Sensibility and Undecidability 
We start with sensibility. Sensibility is the capacity “to acquire representations 
through the way in which we are affected by objects” (A/B). This 
capacity is realized by means of intuitions, immediate and singular 
representations through which objects are given to us (A/B, A/B). 
Empirical intuitions relate us to objects through sensation. And they possess 
a form, a way of ordering the matter of intuition, which “must all lie ready 
for it in the mind a priori” (A/B). This is the pure form of sensibility. 
Kant makes a further claim: that the pure form of human sensibility subsumes 
two more specific forms, space and time. But this claim is explicitly limited 
to human sensibility. Consider the following passages (cf. A–/B–, 
B, B, A–/B): 
For we cannot judge at all whether the intuitions of other thinking 
beings are bound to the same conditions that limit our intuition, and 
that are universally valid for us. (A/B) 
It is also not necessary for us to limit the kind of intuition in space and 
time to the sensibility of human beings; it may well be that all finite 
beings necessarily agree with human beings in this regard (though we 
cannot decide this) (B) 
These passages restrict the claims about space and time to human sensibility. 
How should we understand Kant’s remarks? There is a sense in which he is 




is acknowledging that we cannot rule them out. This, however, is a purely 
epistemic matter. It would be a mistake to read Kant as saying that forms of 
sensibility other than our own are possible in any non-epistemic sense.3 Kant 
does not, here or anywhere else, assert any such thing. On the contrary, on 
the question whether forms of sensibility other than our own are possible in 
a non-epistemic sense, or more specifically whether they are possible in 
whatever non-epistemic sense is at stake in these passages, Kant remains 
explicitly and resolutely agnostic. He refuses to commit either way. “It may 
well be that all finite beings necessarily agree with human beings,” i.e. non-
spatiotemporal sensible forms may, for all we know, be impossible, “though 
we cannot decide this.” And “we cannot judge at all whether the intuitions of 
other thinking beings are bound [presumably necessarily] to the same 
conditions that limit our intuition.” What Kant commits to in these passages 
is an undecidability thesis: we cannot know whether or not discursive 
cognizers with other forms of sensibility are, in whatever sense of possibility 
is at stake here, possible. 
Very well, what sense of possibility is at stake here? What kind of possibility 
does Kant want to leave open? Presumably not logical (i.e. conceptual) 
possibility. Kant says that we cannot judge or decide the matter. And 
presumably he thinks we can judge or decide whether other forms of 
sensibility are logically possible. For there seems to be no contradiction in the 
concept of a non-spatiotemporal sensibility. And there is no suggestion in Kant 
that the spatiotemporal form of our own sensibility is supposed to follow 
analytically from the defining features of sensibility as such—receptivity, 
passivity, and so forth. Kant would not think we need to remain agnostic 
about the logical possibility of a non-spatiotemporal sensibility.  
Perhaps then Kant means to assert that we cannot judge or decide whether 
other forms of sensibility are what we might call ‘formally possible’, i.e. in 
agreement with our own sensible forms (A/B). But this also cannot be 
right. For it is trivial, and so knowable, that other forms of sensibility are not 
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in agreement with our own sensible forms. This reading likewise fails to 
explain why Kant thinks we are not in a position to settle the question. 
We take it, then, that Kant must rather be working with some notion of real 
possibility, a kind of possibility which approximates the contemporary notion 
of metaphysical possibility. There are questions, of course, about how exactly 
to characterise such a notion of possibility. We won’t pursue them here.4 For 
our purposes we can leave our talk of possibility as a placeholder for whatever 
kind of real possibility is appropriate in the context. Kant’s claim is that we 
cannot know whether or not discursive cognizers with other forms of 
sensibility are really possible. Unless relevant, we leave this qualification 
implicit in what follows. 
Kant holds that we cannot judge or decide whether discursive cognizers with 
other forms of sensibility are really possible. How should we understand these 
notions? We shall take them to be epistemic notions that entail our being 
unable to know whether discursive cognizers with other forms of sensibility 
are possible. But what kind of knowledge does Kant think we cannot have? 
There are a multitude of epistemic notions in Kant: analytic knowledge, 
synthetic knowledge, scientific knowledge (Wissen), cognition (Erkenntnis), 
perhaps others. Which of these is in play will depend in part on what kind of 
knowledge he thinks might otherwise be available for the possibility at issue. 
We cannot have analytic knowledge of real possibility (see e.g. Bxxvi; 
Prog.:–). But if logical possibility is a condition on real possibility, 
then perhaps we can have analytic knowledge of real impossibility. The issue 
is delicate and we return to it later. For present purposes we leave our talk of 
knowledge as a placeholder for whatever kind of epistemic relation (to 
whatever kind of real possibility) is appropriate in the context. 
We are now in a position to begin to articulate our target question. Modulo 
the preceding, Kant’s claim in the above passages is that we cannot know 
whether or not discursive cognizers with other sensible forms are possible. 
This undecidability thesis is not our concern in this essay. 5  Instead our 
 
4 For general discussion see e.g. Chignell  and , Stang , and Leech . For 
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concern is whether Kant endorses a symmetrical undecidability thesis about 
the understanding: 
(UNDECIDABILITY) We cannot know whether or not discursive cognizers 
 with other intellectual forms are possible. 
This is one answer to our initial question. If Kant endorses Undecidability, 
then his view of discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms is perfectly 
on a par with his view of discursive cognizers with other sensible forms. 
Undecidability is equivalent to the conjunction of two claims: we cannot 
know that discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms are possible and 
we cannot know that discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms are 
impossible. There will then be two ways of directly opposing the view, each 
corresponding to the negation of one of its conjuncts. First: 
(CONTINGENCY) We can know that discursive cognizers with other 
 intellectual forms are possible. 
While Undecidability leaves open the possibility of discursive cognizers with 
forms of understanding other than our own, Contingency positively affirms 
this possibility; it thereby suggests that our own intellectual forms, although 
necessary for us, are in some deeper sense contingent for discursive cognizers 
as such. Second: 
(NECESSITY) We can know that discursive cognizers with other intellectual 
 forms are impossible. 
While Undecidability leaves open the possibility of discursive cognizers with 
forms of understanding other than our own, Necessity rules out this 
possibility; it suggests that our own intellectual forms are not only necessary 
for us but also in some deeper sense necessary for discursive cognizers as such. 
Contingency and Necessity are contrasting decidability theses. They are 
incompatible with Undecidability and with each other. 
There is an alternative way of carving up the terrain. Consider an epistemic 




just in case it is compatible with what we can know. Both Undecidability and 
Contingency hold that it is epistemically possible that discursive cognizers 
with other forms of the understanding are really possible, while Necessity 
denies this. This alternative taxonomy offers a helpful framework for 
understanding an objection that goes back at least to Hegel: that Kant’s 
idealism threatens to collapse into a form of subjective idealism that precisely 
fails to rule out this epistemic possibility.6 We will not assess the merits of this 
objection here, and since for our purposes it will be important to distinguish 
Undecidability and Contingency (see §), we will continue with the current 
taxonomy. Our question is whether Kant endorses Undecidability, 
Contingency, or Necessity. 
Kant’s explicit undecidability thesis about the possibility of discursive 
cognizers with other sensible forms has provided us with the materials for 
distinguishing three views he might hold about discursive cognizers with 
other intellectual forms. But Kant’s complex conception of intellectual form 
means that each of these views can be further segmented. To complete the 
taxonomic space, we turn to the understanding. 
. The Understanding 
In his discussion of sensibility, Kant characterises the understanding only 
negatively, as a non-sensible faculty of cognition. He later gives us a positive 
characterization of the understanding as “a faculty for judging” or a “faculty 
for thinking” (A/B). Thinking is “cognition through concepts” 
(A/B). Concepts rest on functions and a function is “the unity of the 
action of ordering different representations together under a common one” 
(A/B). Putting this together, we get the idea that the role of the 
understanding is to order different representations under common ones. The 
faculty’s “supreme principle” is the “unity of apperception” (B). 
 
6 See the Science of Logic, vol. , §, §; Encyclopedia, part , §; Lectures on the 
History of Philosophy, the section on Kant, in Hegel –, vols. , ,  respectively. For 
some especially relevant discussion, including of similar concerns in e.g. Reinhold and Fichte, 
see Horstmann  and , Ameriks  and , Förster , Pippin , 




Kant’s identification of an a priori element to the understanding resides in the 
fact that he thinks there are only certain functions of unity by means of which 
we can order representations in judgment. These are the logical functions of 
the understanding in judgment, and they are listed in the Table of Judgment 
(A/B). The table has four titles, each of which has three moments. Since 
“the same function that gives unity to the different representations in a 
judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations 
in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of 
understanding” (A/B–), we are able to identify twelve pure concepts 
of the understanding, each corresponding to one of the logical functions of 
judgment and likewise organized into a table, the Table of Categories. These 
concepts comprise “all original pure concepts of synthesis that the 
understanding contains in itself a priori” (A/B). 
In § we saw that Kant thinks we cannot know whether or not discursive 
cognizers with different pure forms of sensibility are possible. Kant’s 
distinction between the Table of Judgment and the Table of Categories gives 
us two levels at which we might formulate a symmetrical undecidability thesis 
about the intellectual forms. First, we might take it to be undecidable whether 
discursive cognizers with different functions of judgment are possible. Second, 
we might take it to be undecidable whether discursive cognizers with different 
pure concepts are possible. Intellectual form has two aspects and thus two ways 
in which it might vary among discursive cognizers. 
Intellectual form will be variable if either of its aspects is variable, or 
equivalently, it will be invariable only if both of its aspects are invariable. Thus 
those who think it is undecidable whether or not other discursive cognizers 
are possible with respect to both aspects of intellectual form are committed to 
Undecidability. Those who think that we can know both that discursive 
cognizers with other functions of judgment are impossible and that discursive 
cognizers with other pure concepts are impossible are committed to Necessity. 
Contingency says that we can know that intellectual form is variable, so it is 
equivalent to a disjunction: either we can know that discursive cognizers with 
other functions of judgment are possible or we can know that discursive 




Given the connection between Kant’s two tables, we will assume throughout 
that if the functions of judgment are variable, then so are the pure concepts. 
More fully, we will assume that, if it is possible for there to be discursive 
cognizers with different functions of judgment, then it is possible for there to 
be discursive cognizers with different categories. And for the majority of our 
discussion, we will also assume the converse: if it is possible for there to be 
discursive cognizers with different categories, then it is possible for there to 
be discursive cognizers with different functions of judgment. This assumption 
is warranted by Kant’s insistence on there being a kind of identity between 
these two aspects of intellectual form (A/B–, B). It ensures that 
they cannot vary independently of one another, leaving us with the same 
options as before. But someone might hold that the categories could vary 
while the functions of judgment remain fixed, and this could lead to mixed 
views. We consider that scenario explicitly in §. 
There is one further complication. In addition to distinguishing between the 
functions of judgment and the pure concepts, Kant also distinguishes between 
general logic and transcendental logic. General logic concerns “the form of 
thinking in general,” whereas transcendental logic “has to do merely with the 
laws of the understanding and reason, but solely insofar as they are related to 
objects a priori” (A–/B–). The Table of Categories belongs to 
transcendental logic, as does the full Table of Judgment, which includes a 
moment of singular quantity distinct from the moment of universal quantity 
and a moment of infinite quality distinct from the moment of affirmative 
quality. But Kant sometimes talks as though a table of judgment without these 
third moments of quantity and quality would belong to general logic (A–
/B–). And while certain laws and inference rules, like non-contradiction, 
modus tollens, and excluded middle, clearly belong to general logic (JL:–
), it is far less clear how exactly they relate to the Table of Judgment. 
These observations raise a set of interesting questions about the relation of 
general logic to the functions of judgment and the categories. For our 
purposes, and given that Kant thinks of general logic as an aspect of the pure 
form of the understanding (Aff./Bff.), it raises the question of whether 
it provides a further level at which we can ask our question of whether Kant 
endorses undecidability about other intellectual forms. Specifically: does Kant 




logics are possible, or is he as resolutely agnostic about logical aliens as he is 
about sensible aliens?7 
We will not pursue this aspect of our topic here. It is relevant if one thinks 
that we can know that discursive cognizers with other general logics are 
possible, for then—given the connections between general and transcendental 
logic—we should also be in a position to know that discursive cognizers with 
other functions of judgment and other pure concepts are possible. Such a view 
on general logic would all but entail Contingency. But the other stances that 
one might take on general logic leave open all the options on the other aspects 
of intellectual form. For instance, a necessity thesis about general logic does 
not obviously entail a necessity thesis about the categories—that would 
depend on the precise relation between general logic and the categories. Thus 
although it is related, the question of whether or not discursive cognizers with 
other general logics are possible is distinct from the question which is our 
concern here. 
We are now in a position to begin evaluation of the options. Our question 
concerns discursive cognizers with other intellectual—i.e. judgmental and 
categorial—forms. We have introduced three views. Contingency holds that 
we can know that discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms are 
possible. Necessity holds that we can know that discursive cognizers with 
other intellectual forms are impossible. Undecidability says that we cannot 
know whether or not discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms are 
possible. Which, if any, does Kant endorse? 
. Against Contingency 
We begin with a brief comment on Contingency. It holds that we can know 
that discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms are possible. Since Kant 
holds that we cannot know whether discursive cognizers with other sensible 
forms are possible, it is a view on which our knowledge is not symmetrically 
limited with regard to other intellectual forms. We do not think that 
Contingency is a plausible view. Our reasons for this will come out in the rest 
 




of the essay. In this section we just want to motivate our decision not to 
consider Contingency in detail alongside the other two views. 
Let us start by flagging a potential confusion. We have said that Kant commits 
to an undecidability thesis about our sensible forms: he holds that we cannot 
know whether discursive cognizers with other sensible forms are possible. 
However it is not uncommon to ascribe to Kant the view that discursive 
cognizers with other sensible forms are possible. This would be an 
endorsement of contingency about the pure forms of sensibility. We think 
that the passages above do not admit of this reading. But if one did read Kant 
in this way, then (intellectual) Contingency would look to be the symmetrical 
view about the intellectual forms. And this is important, because some of 
those who have endorsed Contingency seem to be motivated by its supposed 
symmetry with Kant’s claims about sensibility. That is, they take Contingency 
to be the symmetrical claim to that which Kant endorses in the passages above 
about the sensible forms. 8  But this is incorrect. Considerations about 
symmetry do not support ascribing Contingency to Kant. 
Indeed, given Kant’s commitment to undecidability about the sensible forms, 
it seems to us that Contingency should look dubious from the outset. If we 
cannot know that discursive cognizers with other sensible forms are possible, 
how could we fare better when it comes to knowing that discursive cognizers 
with other intellectual forms are possible? There seem to us no good reasons 
to think that there is something which prevents us from knowing whether 
there could be discursive cognizers with other sensible forms but which 
nevertheless presents no obstacle to our knowing that discursive cognizers 
with other intellectual forms are possible. 
The converse does not hold: there is nothing on the face of it which is 
problematic about allowing that we can know more about the impossibility of 
discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms than we can about the 
impossibility of discursive cognizers with other sensible forms. It is only 
Contingency, not Necessity, which looks problematic when situated against 
Kant’s commitment to undecidability about other sensible forms. So if you 
think, contra Necessity, that Kant wants to leave epistemic room for the 
 




possibility of other intellectual forms, then Undecidability is the option for 
you. For these reasons, we will not consider Contingency any further. 
. Textual Considerations 
We are left with Undecidability, the view that we cannot know whether or 
not discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms are possible, and 
Necessity, the view that we can know that discursive cognizers with other 
intellectual forms are not possible. We begin in this section with textual 
considerations. Since Contingency is off the table, we assume in what follows 
that considerations that tell against Necessity tell in favour of Undecidability 
and vice versa. 
. Against Necessity 
We start with the following well known passage, which has often been 
thought to tell against Necessity: 
But for the peculiarity of our understanding, that it is able to bring 
about the unity of apperception a priori only by means of the categories 
and only through precisely this kind and number of them, a further 
ground may be offered just as little as one can be offered for why we 
have precisely these and no other functions for judgment or for why 
space and time are the sole forms of our possible intuition. (B–; 
cf. Prol.:; C:) 
The passage seems to say that, in the same way that we can give no 
explanation as to why we have the forms of sensibility that we do, so too we 
can give no explanation of why we have the categories and functions of 
judgment that we do. If we can give no explanation of these facts, then one 
might think that we cannot rule out the possibility of discursive cognizers 
whose forms of sensibility and understanding differ. This looks to contravene 
Necessity, which holds that we can rule out the possibility of discursive 
cognizers with other intellectual forms.9 
 




This is a challenging passage for the proponent of Necessity but it is not 
decisive. The passage says that the sensible and intellectual forms are 
symmetric in that, in both cases, no further ground may be offered as to why 
we have them. But it is compatible with this symmetry that there is an 
asymmetry in that for which no further ground is available. In the case of the 
sensible forms, there is no further ground to be offered for why they are the 
forms of specifically human discursive cognition. In the case of the intellectual 
forms, it may be that there is no further ground to be offered for why they 
are the forms of discursive cognition in general. The passage allows such a 
reading. 
Moreover, since the claim is that no further ground can be offered, we ought 
to look to the broader context of the passage to see what grounds have been 
offered up to this point. It occurs in the Transcendental Deduction, §, 
which is to say as a “Remark” on the already completed first step of the 
Deduction. Not least, then, it occurs after the main discussion of the unity of 
apperception, and we may well expect that no further ground for the 
intellectual forms can be given at this stage in Kant’s argument. The Necessity 
theorist may hold that everything which has been said already about the 
nature of the understanding in general suffices to ground our possession of 
these forms and no others.10 
We return to this passage in a moment. First it will be instructive to consider 
another set of passages that might be thought to tell against Necessity. The 
following from the Prolegomena is an example: 
It would be an even greater absurdity for us not to allow any things in 
themselves at all, or for us to want to pass off our experience for the 
only possible mode of cognition of things – hence our intuition in 
space and time for the only possible intuition and our discursive 
understanding for the archetype of every possible understanding – and 
 
10 See Wolff : – for the classic statement of this response, where he points out that 
it also applies to two related passages (Prol.:; C:). See also Allison : ff., 
: . We return to the issue in §. For further discussion of the Deduction in this 




so to want to take principles of the possibility of experience for 
universal conditions on things in themselves. (:–) 
This passage counsels against taking our forms of sensibility to be the only 
forms of sensibility and, correspondingly, against taking our form of 
understanding to be the only form of understanding. Again, the implication 
would seem to be that we should not rule out the possibility of cognizers with 
other forms of understanding. This would tell against Necessity. 
The Necessity theorist can provide an alternative reading of this passage. It 
certainly does counsel against our ruling out the possibility of beings with 
other forms of understanding. But it is a further step to say that it counsels 
against our ruling out the possibility of discursive beings with other forms of 
understanding. And it is this latter claim which is needed if it is to be used 
against Necessity. An alternative construal of the passage reads it in light of 
those texts in which Kant distinguishes discursive from non-discursive 
cognition (e.g. B, B–, B–, A, A–/B–, A–
/B–; CPJ:ff.; C:ff.). Kant is clear, across these texts, that we 
must allow for the possibility of non-discursive cognizers, beings for whom 
cognition does not depend on the cooperation of two distinct faculties, 
sensibility and the understanding. If there could be any such beings, then our 
forms of experience will not be the only possible mode of cognition of things. 
This is what the passage from the Prolegomena tells us. But to allow that is not 
yet to allow that there could be discursive cognizers whose understanding has 
different forms. The passage from the Prolegomena is silent on this further 
question. 
This suggests a general strategy open to the Necessity theorist for reading any 
particular text in which it looks as though Kant is leaving room for the 
possibility of discursive cognizers with alternative forms of the understanding. 
The Necessity theorist can maintain that, properly contextualised, the passage 
in question only allows the possibility of non-discursive cognizers. And the 
possibility of non-discursive cognizers does not tell against the impossibility 




With this strategy in hand, let us now return to the first passage we discussed, 
about the supposed “peculiarity of our understanding” at B–. Here is the 
rest of the paragraph from which that passage is taken: 
In the above proof, however, I still could not abstract from one point, 
namely, from the fact that the manifold for intuition must already be 
given prior to the synthesis of understanding and independently from 
it; how, however, is here left undetermined. For if I wanted to think of 
an understanding that itself intuited (as, say, a divine understanding, 
which would not represent given objects, but through whose 
representation the objects would themselves at the same time be given, 
or produced), then the categories would have no significance at all with 
regard to such a cognition. They are only rules for an understanding 
whose entire capacity consists in thinking, i.e., in the action of bringing 
the synthesis of the manifold that is given to it in intuition from 
elsewhere to the unity of apperception, which therefore cognizes 
nothing at all by itself, but only combines and orders the material for 
cognition, the intuition, which must be given to it through the object. 
(B)  
Far from telling against Necessity, this part of the passage can seem to tell in 
favour of the view. To be sure Kant points out that the categories have “no 
significance” for a non-discursive understanding. But his contrast class—the 
class of understanding for which the categories do have significance—might 
be interpreted as the discursive understanding in general, not the human 
understanding specifically. And on this interpretation, the passage supports 
Necessity, the view that the categories have significance for the discursive 
understanding in general. 
. Against Undecidability 
We have considered passages that seem to tell against Necessity. Are there 
passages which seem to tell against Undecidability? Consider the following, 
from a little later in the Transcendental Deduction: 
The pure concepts of the understanding are free from this limitation 
[sc. the limitation of space and time, that they are conditions of the 




objects of experience] and extend to objects of intuition in general, 
whether the latter be similar to our own or not, as long as it is sensible 
and not intellectual. (B)  
Here Kant states that the pure concepts of the understanding extend to 
objects of sensible intuition in general, and one might read that as saying that 
any being which is given objects in sensible intuition must use the pure 
concepts of the understanding to think about those objects. This would seem 
to rule out the possibility of discursive cognizers with different pure concepts 
of the understanding, contrary to Undecidability. 
But this is an overreach. The passage says only that all objects of sensible 
intuition can be thought by means of the categories. It follows that there can 
be no sensible objects which could not be thought by creatures possessing the 
categories. It doesn’t follow that there could not be other creatures possessing 
different forms of the understanding who could similarly think all objects of 
sensible intuition, albeit by means of their own pure concepts.11 Perhaps the 
same objects can be thought by means of different pure concepts. So the 
passage is compatible with Undecidability. 
A wider strategy open to Undecidability theorists can be brought out by 
considering a textual objection thrown up by the rest of the passage from 
which the above sentence is taken. Here is the whole passage: 
The pure concepts of the understanding are free from this limitation 
and extend to objects of intuition in general, whether the latter be 
similar to our own or not, as long as it is sensible and not intellectual. 
But this further extension of concepts beyond our sensible intuition 
does not get us anywhere. For they are then merely empty concepts of 
objects, through which we cannot even judge whether the latter are 
possible or not – mere forms of thought without objective reality – 
since we have available no intuition to which the synthetic unity of 
apperception, which they alone contain, could be applied, and that 
could thus determine an object. Our sensible and empirical intuition 
alone can provide them with sense and significance. (B–) 
 




We have already considered the first sentence of the passage. But now consider 
what the passage says about the relation between the pure concepts of the 
understanding and the unity of apperception: that “they alone contain” the 
synthetic unity of apperception. The German (“jene allein enthalten”) is 
ambiguous between two readings. Either Kant means that only the pure 
concepts contain the unity of apperception, or he means that the pure 
concepts contain only the unity of apperception.12 Both readings can seem to 
support Necessity and tell against Undecidability. 
Take the first: only the pure concepts contain the unity of apperception. This 
means there are no other concepts which contain the unity of apperception. 
So it looks as though there can be no discursive cognizers—cognizers with a 
discursive understanding, and thus with the unity of apperception—who 
have other concepts containing the unity of apperception. Since for 
something to be a pure concept of the understanding, it must contain the 
unity of apperception, these pure concepts must be the only pure concepts of 
the understanding. Take the second reading: the pure concepts contain 
nothing but the unity of apperception. Now if there are discursive cognizers 
with different pure concepts, their pure concepts too must contain nothing 
but the unity of apperception. But, for Kant, facts about containment 
relations set the individuation conditions for concepts. 13  In particular, if 
concept A contains only concepts C and D, and concept B contains only 
concepts C and D, then concept A just is concept B. It follows that the pure 
concepts of other discursive cognizers would be identical to our pure 
concepts, contrary to the hypothesis. On either reading, the passage seems to 
support Necessity. 
There might well be ways for the Undecidability theorist to reject one horn 
or other of this dilemma. Perhaps, for instance, Kant doesn’t mean to invoke 
his notion of concept containment here, in which case the second reading 
might not support Necessity. But another plausible route would be to take 
the entire passage at B– as involving a tacit relativization to our forms of 
the understanding. Note, for instance, the uses of the first-person plural 
 
12 Guyer and Wood, in the translation from which we have been quoting, render it in the 
first way. Both Kemp Smith and Pluhar render it in the second. 




throughout the passage, including in the final sentence. And this is important 
because it suggests a general strategy open to Undecidability theorists for 
reading any particular text in which it looks as though Kant is ruling out the 
possibility of discursive cognizers with alternative forms of the understanding 
and so endorsing Necessity. They can maintain that, properly contextualised, 
the passage in question only rules out the possibility of alternative forms of 
the understanding for us. And the impossibility of our possessing alternative 
forms of the understanding does not tell against the possibility of other 
discursive cognizers with alternative forms of the understanding. This leaves 
room for Undecidability, which entails that we cannot rule out such a 
possibility. 
An important application of this strategy would be to those crucial passages 
in which Kant suggests that the categories and the functions of judgment are 
complete and can be derived from a single principle or from the faculty of the 
understanding itself (A/B, A–/B–; Prol..; MFNS:; 
VM:). These passages support Necessity if one reads them as proposing 
a complete derivation from the discursive understanding in general, or from 
a principle that applies generally to discursive cognizers as such. For if we can 
show that the categories and the functions of judgment are derived in this 
way, then we can know that discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms 
are impossible. 
If, however, the starting point for such a derivation is the human 
understanding specifically, then these passages are compatible with 
Undecidability, since they then indicate only the impossibility of human 
cognizers with other intellectual forms. We look at this issue in more detail in 
§. But, as a start, the Undecidability theorist can point to the many passages 
in the Transcendental Logic where Kant talks about the human 
understanding specifically, passages in which, by the Necessity theorist’s 
lights, we could reasonably expect him to be talking about the discursive 
understanding in general. Thus, right at the start of the Transcendental 
Analytic, Kant writes that he “will therefore pursue the pure concepts into 
their first seeds and predispositions in the human understanding” (A/B, 
our italics; cf. B, A/B, A, A, B, B, A–/B–, 
A/B). As above, the thought is that those passages in which Kant 




as operating under a tacit restriction to our own, human understanding. After 
all, the same restriction is often required but not explicit in Kant’s statements 
about sensibility, for example when he says, “In this investigation it will be 
found that there are two pure forms of sensible intuition as principles of a 
priori cognition, namely space and time” (A/B). 
This bears on the relevance to our question of the various sophisticated 
attempts to account for the full details of Kant’s claims to derivation and 
completeness. 14  For it is not straightforward to determine whether these 
accounts should even be understood as aiming to establish Necessity given 
that the distinctions which we have drawn in this essay have not been central 
to that debate. Michael Wolff (: , ff.), for example, claims that 
Kant’s derivation concerns a specifically human understanding.15 On the face 
of it, this makes Wolff ’s account compatible with Undecidability. His reason 
for the restriction, however, is the recognition that Kant is clearly not 
concerned to provide an account that would also capture the forms of a non-
discursive intellect. That is surely correct, but our question in this essay is 
precisely whether Kant leaves room for something else here, namely a 
discursive intellect that isn’t human. The import for our debate of Kant’s 
claims to derivation and completeness depend crucially on how we are to 
understand his starting point. 
The Undecidability theorist’s strategy here is the natural counterpoint to the 
one we saw above for the Necessity theorist. Where the Necessity theorist 
appeals to Kant’s frequent reference to the non-discursive intellect, the 
Undecidability theorist appeals to Kant’s frequent reference to the human 
intellect. And whilst there will no doubt be other passages which are relevant 
to this debate, not least from the practical writings and the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment, we suspect that Undecidability and Necessity theorists will 
each be able to use versions of these general strategies for reconciling any 
problematic passage with their respective views. Textual considerations alone 
won’t settle the dispute and we turn now to more systematic considerations. 
 
14 See especially Reich , Wolff , and Schulting . For critical discussion see e.g. 
Krüger , Brandt , Baumanns , Longuenesse  and , Allison : 
ff., and Lu-Adler . 




For reasons of space we restrict ourselves to the theoretical philosophy, though 
what we say in §§– will have broader implications. 
. Systematic Considerations 
. Against Necessity 
We begin with a challenge for Necessity. Necessity says that we can know that 
other intellectual forms are impossible. But what kind of knowledge is this? 
It is presumably a priori. But is it synthetic or analytic? The opponent of 
Necessity might claim that either option looks problematic. 
Suppose first that the knowledge Necessity says we can have is synthetic a 
priori knowledge that other intellectual forms are impossible. One of the aims 
of the Critique of Pure Reason is to explain how it is that we can have synthetic 
a priori knowledge in mathematics, pure natural science, and metaphysics. 
But Kant’s explanation makes central appeal to the claim that we have two 
pure forms of sensibility, space and time, and he thinks that we cannot know 
whether these forms are common to discursive cognizers generally. This 
explanation, at least, could not account for our synthetic a priori knowledge 
that discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms are impossible. There 
therefore remains an issue about how we can have the knowledge which 
Necessity ascribes to us, if that knowledge is synthetic a priori. 
Suppose instead, then, that the knowledge Necessity says we can have is 
analytic knowledge that other intellectual forms are impossible. How could 
analysis demonstrate the truth of the Necessity thesis? Is it plausible, for 
instance, that Kant thought it part of the concept of discursive cognition as 
such that discursive cognizers have these and only these pure concepts? And 
are we sure that analysis can demonstrate an impossibility of the relevant kind, 
namely a real impossibility? 
If the Necessity thesis can be neither synthetic nor analytic, then we have a 
line of reasoning in support of Undecidability. 
Can this dilemma be resisted? Start with the view that the knowledge involved 




knowledge which isn’t accounted for by Kant’s explanation, by appeal to our 
pure forms of sensibility, of how it is that we can have synthetic a priori 
knowledge. Is this a problem? There is plausibly a range of claims that Kant 
makes in the Critique which are synthetic a priori and yet which don’t seem 
to be accounted for by this explanation. Consider the claim that there is a 
distinction between intuitions and concepts. This doesn’t look to be analytic, 
nor is it known a posteriori. Yet it plays a central role in Kant’s theory. We 
need some account of how Kant thinks such claims are known. So if the 
knowledge involved in Necessity is synthetic a priori yet not subject to Kant’s 
explanation by appeal to our pure forms of sensibility, then it does not look 
isolated in this regard. 
This response is fine as far as it goes. But someone who takes this line either 
owes us an alternative explanation of the synthetic a priori knowledge that is 
not explained by Kant’s appeal to our pure forms of sensibility or owes us a 
criterion for distinguishing those synthetic a priori claims which require 
explanation from those which do not. Either would be a substantial 
commitment. But consider a particular and reasonably plausible candidate: 
that the synthetic a priori claims which either have an alternative explanation 
or do not require explanation are the ones which are exclusively about our 
mind’s representational structures. 16  This does not obviously include the 
claim that discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms are really 
impossible. So the Necessity theorist either needs to explain why it is so 
included or needs to provide some other criterion for distinguishing the two 
classes of synthetic a priori claims. The synthetic horn of the dilemma for 
Necessity is not indefensible. But it requires further detail and explication of 
some of the central doctrines of the Critical system. 
Consider now the second horn, that the knowledge involved in Necessity is 
analytic. Would it be a problem to hold that it is analytic of discursive 
cognition as such that it involves just these and no other intellectual forms? 
On this view, the Necessity thesis might be thought comparable to the claim 
that discursive cognition involves sensibility and understanding or the claim 
that sensibility is passive and receptive while the understanding is active and 
spontaneous—perhaps these claims simply articulate the concepts in question 
 




or in some other way proceed from sheer analysis of the faculties in question.17 
And perhaps it is similarly analytic of discursive cognition as such that it has 
these particular forms. Recall that Kant often suggests that the categories and 
the functions of judgment are complete and can be derived from a single 
principle or from the faculty of the understanding itself (A/B, A/B, 
A–/B–; Prol.:; MFNS:; VM:). The thought would 
be that this derivation is supposed to be analytic and that it turns on features 
of the discursive understanding in general, such as the unity of apperception 
or the definition of discursive judgment. 
For instance, suppose that Kant thinks it analytic of discursive judgment as 
such that it be predicative and that its atomic form be categorical, i.e. that it 
involve predicating one concept of another. If this were the case, it could then 
be analytic that the extension of “the subject is either wholly included in or 
excluded from the [extension] of the predicate or is only in part included in 
or excluded from it” (JL:, original emphasis removed). Such an analysis 
would give us the first two moments of each of quantity and quality, alongside 
the first moment of relation, which together yield the Aristotelian square of 
opposition. Perhaps one can get from here to the full Table of Judgment and, 
from there, to the categories themselves—though it’s worth noting that what’s 
most novel in Kant’s Table of Judgment are precisely those aspects that go 
beyond anything involved in the Aristotelian square of opposition, namely 
his inclusion of the third moments of quantity and quality, his inclusion of a 
distinct variable for relation with just as many moments, and his treatment of 
modality.18 
Regardless, note that if this procedure is to support the claim that the 
knowledge involved in Necessity is analytic, it needs to be the case both that 
the starting point of the derivation be something about discursive cognizers 
 
17  Kant distinguishes concept analysis from faculty analysis at A/B. This may be 
important, for instance because while Kant thinks we can never be apodictically certain that 
the analysis of a non-mathematical concept is complete (A–/B–), matters might 
be different for the analysis of faculties. See Wolff : –, – for discussion. 
18 See Tonelli . The trichotomous aspect of Kant’s tables alone might suggest that they 
cannot be arrived at purely analytically since analytic division proceeds according to the 
principle of contradiction alone and therefore only ever yields dichotomies, whereas 
trichotomies come from synthetic division by first dividing but then also uniting condition 




as such and that the derivation proceed solely by analysis. We observed above 
that the Undecidability theorist might read the starting point for Kant’s 
derivation as restricted to the human understanding specifically. But they 
might also deny that the derivation proceeds solely by analysis. Kant, after all, 
allows for synthetic derivations, understood as ones which do not proceed 
solely in accordance with the principle of contradiction but “by some other 
principle” (Disc. :–). Thus even granting that the starting point for 
Kant’s derivation is the discursive understanding in general, if that derivation 
is synthetic and proceeds from a principle that, for all we can know, holds 
only for humans, the result would be compatible with Undecidability.19 
To secure the analytic reading of the Necessity thesis, then, we would need to 
be sure both that Kant’s starting point is not restricted to the human 
understanding and that his derivation proceeds solely through analysis and 
not by appeal to our forms of sensibility or anything else that would render 
the result compatible with Undecidability. Again, the point is not that the 
analytic reading of the Necessity thesis is implausible, just that more has to 
be said about the nature of the analysis and the knowledge it provides. 
Would we also need some reassurance that, if such an analysis took the form 
of showing our inability to represent something, this inability had any bearing 
on real possibility? Isn’t Kant suspicious of any general entailments between 
the shape of our representational capacities and the real nature of things (save 
in the special case of appearances)? He is. But the only reassurance that we 
need in this context is that logical (or conceptual) impossibility entails real 
impossibility—an entailment that will strike many people as incontestable, 
both as a principle in its own right and as a commitment of Kant’s.20 
It is worth noting the bearing that this has on Stephen Engstrom’s (: 
–) appeal to Kant’s claim that we can’t represent any beings as thinkers 
except by “transference” of our own consciousness to them (A–/B–
; cf. A–). Taking the categories to be conditions of such consciousness, 
 
19 We discuss one such approach in §. below. See Longuenesse : ch.. 
20 This may not be as straightforward as it appears. At least one of us thinks there is room for 
doubt as to whether Kant endorses any such general entailment. For discussion which bears 
on the general issues here, see Bader, forthcoming, and for some relevant remarks, see e.g. 




Engstrom concludes that we can’t represent thinkers—nor therefore 
discursive cognizers—who possess categories other than our own. From this 
he infers Necessity.21 This argument looks especially vulnerable to the concern 
that our inability to represent something is one matter, the real impossibility 
of that thing another matter entirely. For even if we admit that there are no 
categories other than our own such that we can represent discursive cognizers 
who possess them, mustn’t we keep an open mind on whether that’s because 
there is a real possibility here that we cannot (fully) represent? We must. But 
Engstrom’s argument, if successful, shows more than that. It shows that we 
can’t represent discursive cognizers who possess categories other than our own. 
If that’s right, and if it’s right because of what counts as an insight achieved 
through analysis—we are passing no judgment on whether Engstrom’s 
argument actually shows either of these things—then it’s logically impossible 
for there to be such cognizers and hence, given the entailment noted above, 
really impossible.22 
Return to the dilemma. The point we want to emphasize here is that both 
responses share a common form. The challenge to the Necessity theorist was 
that the Necessity thesis must be either analytic or synthetic and that neither 
option looks plausible. In each case, the response is to claim that what was 
posed as a dilemma for the Necessity theorist is really just the question of 
what status to give Kant’s fundamental claims about the mind. And this raises 
a final, more general issue about the knowledge involved in Necessity. Since 
it is a priori knowledge, we must be able to have it, in some sense, through 
reflection on the forms and activities of our own mind. But, the 
Undecidability theorist might press, how could reflection on the form and 
activities of our own mind put us in a position to know anything about other 
discursive cognizers? The Necessity theorist owes us an account of the source 
and nature of the knowledge they claim we can have. 
 
21 See Kitcher : – and Nunez : § for related discussion. 
22  The point can be made in terms of Kant’s distinction between positive and negative 
conceptions (e.g. at B). Our merely being unable positively to conceive of something 
leaves us needing to keep an open mind as to whether there might nevertheless be a real 
possibility here that we cannot positively represent. Not so if we can’t even form a negative 
conception of something, for instance because “its concept cancels itself out” (A/B), 
for then we simply have nothing in mind about which we should keep an open mind. See 




. Against Undecidability 
We turn now to a set of systematic considerations against Undecidability. 
Consider the unity of apperception. We assume that it is common ground in 
our dispute that this much is shared by all discursive cognizers, since it is 
constitutive of what it is to have a discursive understanding. Even 
Undecidability theorists must accept that there is a function of the 
understanding which is shared by all discursive beings, namely that of 
ordering representations under common ones in accordance with the 
principle of the unity of apperception. For this is just an explication of what 
it is to possess a discursive understanding. And this is what we would expect 
a commitment to Undecidability to entail. For the same is true of sensibility: 
space and time might, for all we know, be peculiar to us, but Kant thinks that 
there is a passive, receptive function to sensibility as such that is shared by all 
discursive beings, simply in virtue of possessing a faculty of sensibility. In 
taking there to be a function of the understanding which is shared by all 
discursive beings, the Undecidability theorist is simply treating the two 
faculties on a par. 
This already undermines some of the worries of the previous section. For if 
we can somehow know that any creature with a discursive understanding 
must enjoy the unity of apperception, then the same question will arise: is 
this knowledge analytic or synthetic? But put this to one side for a moment. 
We can instead ask: what is the relation between the discursive understanding 
in general and the forms of the understanding in particular? The 
Undecidability theorist accepts that there is a characterization of the 
understanding on which it is shared by all discursive cognizers: namely, the 
understanding as the unity of apperception. It is central to that 
characterization that it involves the function of ordering representations 
under common ones in accordance with the principle of the unity of 
apperception. And the Undecidability theorist also holds that there is a more 
specific characterization of human understanding which involves reference to 
our specific intellectual forms. The question which the Necessity theorist will 
push is: what explains our inability to know whether this more specific 




The Necessity theorist holds that just as we can know that the unity of 
apperception is invariant across discursive cognizers, so too can we know that 
our particular intellectual forms are invariant across discursive cognizers. For 
the analytic Necessity theorist, this is because our particular intellectual forms 
are analytically derived from the discursive understanding itself; for the 
synthetic Necessity theorist, it is because reflection on the mind’s structure 
somehow suffices to show the invariance. In contrast, the Undecidability 
theorist thinks that we can know that the unity of apperception is shared 
whilst not being in a position to decide whether our particular intellectual 
forms are invariable. But what could explain our being able to know the 
invariance of the former without being able to know the invariance of the 
latter? The challenge for the Undecidability theorist is to explain how our 
being able to know of invariance at the more general level is compatible with 
our being unable to know of invariance at the specific level. 
One way for the Undecidability theorist to respond to this worry is by noting 
that a symmetrical question can be posed about the pure forms of sensibility. 
There too we have a fundamental characterization which applies to any 
discursive cognizer: sensibility is a passive, receptive faculty. And we have too 
a characterization of our sensibility which, for all we know, applies only to 
human beings: its pure forms are space and time. One might equally ask: what 
explains our inability to know that this more specific characterization applies 
to discursive cognizers more generally? The same issue arises for both 
sensibility and the understanding, so where’s the asymmetry? The Necessity 
theorist would be on stronger ground if there were a principled reason to 
think that there is an explanation for the undecidability of sensible variation 
which does not also apply to the understanding. 
Another, perhaps more satisfying way for the Undecidability theorist to 
respond would be to rise to the challenge. Can the Undecidability theorist 
explain how our being able to know that the unity of apperception is invariant 
among discursive cognizers is compatible with our inability to know whether 
the same is true of our particular intellectual forms? One natural way to 
provide such an explanation is to find a point at which our sensible nature 
enters into Kant’s account of those forms. This would provide an explanation 
of the discrepancy in the Undecidability theorist’s narrative. For if it is 




suitably implicated in an account of our intellectual forms, then it will 
likewise be undecidable whether these particular intellectual forms can vary 
even whilst it can be known that the unity of apperception is invariant. 
Is there any way to enact such an approach? Consider Béatrice Longuenesse’s 
claim that the categories “are a priori determined by ‘the subjective conditions 
of the spontaneity of thought’ (the logical functions of judgment) together 
with the ‘first formal grounds of sensibility’ (space and time)” (: , our 
italics).23 The basic idea here seems to be that, since the categories are rules 
for the synthesis of the sensible manifold, just what these rules are will be 
determined, in part, by the kind of sensible manifold that is to be synthesized. 
This will be compatible with the a priori status of the categories, so long as 
the aspects of our sensible nature that enter in here are likewise a priori. But 
the salient point for our purposes is that, on the face of it, such a view 
promises to give us just the sort of explanation demanded of the 
Undecidability theorist. For if the pure forms of sensibility are involved in the 
a priori determination of the categories, and if it is undecidable whether the 
pure forms of sensibility can vary between discursive cognizers, then it will 
likewise be undecidable whether the categories can vary between discursive 
cognizers. 
Yet there are problems with appealing to Longuenesse’s view in defense of 
Undecidability in this way. First note that such an approach would explain 
only why we are not in a position to know whether the categories can vary, 
not why we are not in a position to know whether the logical functions of 
judgment can vary. It would therefore not be a pure Undecidability view but 
rather a mixed view of the kind mooted in §. Second, to the extent that the 
pure forms of sensibility are involved in the a priori determination of the 
categories but not the logical functions of judgment, the view faces questions 
about how to make sense of Kant’s insistence on there being a kind of identity 
between the two (see especially A/B–, B). Finally, the view so 
employed cannot collapse into the claim that the pure forms of sensibility are 
involved only in the determination of the categories insofar as they are subject 
 
23 Cf. Longuenesse : : “the cooperation of the understanding, as a capacity to judge, 





to a process of schematization. For the Necessity theorist will accept that our 
sensible nature enters into the determination of intellectual form at this point 
and can thus allow that we cannot know whether discursive cognizers with 
other schematized categories are really possible. In order for this approach to 
be of help to the Undecidability theorist, the claim must be that our sensible 
nature enters into an account of the categories even before they are subject to 
schematization.24 
This is not to say that Undecidability is indefensible. It may be that some 
other explanation can be given for our inability to know whether the 
particular intellectual forms can vary whilst being in a position to know that 
the unity of apperception cannot vary. But we can put these considerations 
together with those of the previous subsection to make a more general point 
about our debate. 
Both views hold that we can know that discursive cognizers without the unity 
of apperception are impossible. And both views hold that we cannot know 
whether discursive cognizers with other sensible forms are possible. They 
differ as to whether we can know whether discursive cognizers with other 
intellectual forms are possible. What the considerations adduced in the last 
two subsections draw out is that Kant is committed to there being some claim 
about the structure of mind which we are in a position to know is really 
impossible. And similarly, Kant is committed to there being some claim about 
the structure of mind which we are not in a position to know is really possible 
or really impossible. A satisfying defense of either Necessity or Undecidability 
must cohere with these other instances of and restrictions on knowledge. That 
is to say, any satisfying resolution to our debate will be but one part of a more 
general story about Kant’s account of the nature and limits of our knowledge 
of mind. 
. Second-Order Undecidability 
Our question is whether Kant thinks it is possible to know whether or not 
discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms are possible. Undecidability 
 





is the view that we cannot know whether discursive cognizers with other 
intellectual forms are possible. Necessity is the view that we can know that 
discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms are impossible. We have 
argued thus far that textual and systematic considerations do not decide 
between these views. Each is either supported by or at least compatible with 
the relevant texts, each has systematic considerations which tell in its favour, 
and the systematic considerations which tell against each can be mitigated in 
plausible ways. 
The apparent inability of the textual and systematic considerations to settle 
our debate opens up an intriguing possibility. Perhaps Kant thinks we cannot 
know which of Undecidability or Necessity is true. That would explain the 
lack of decisive textual support for either reading. It would explain the 
contrast between Kant’s explicit statement of undecidability in the sensible 
case and his lack of explicit statement either way about the intellectual case. 
And it would explain why we have not identified a systematic consideration 
which decisively supports one view over the other. Such a view would amount 
to an undecidability thesis about Undecidability and Necessity themselves. It 
would be a second-order undecidability thesis. For Undecidability is an 
undecidability thesis and Necessity a decidability thesis. 
We suggested at the end of the last section that a satisfying resolution to our 
debate will be but one part of a more general story about Kant’s account of 
the nature and limits of our knowledge of mind. This holds true for the 
current proposal. If Kant thinks we cannot know which of Undecidability or 
Necessity is true, that too must fit within his more general account of our 
knowledge of mind. In this section and the next we draw on two such aspects 
of Kant’s account to explore the possibility that he was neutral on the issue. 
In the present section we argue that Kant’s commitment to decidability in 
transcendental philosophy does not rule out a second-order undecidability 
thesis concerning Undecidability and Necessity. In the next section we argue 
that Kant’s commitment to a kind of luminosity principle nevertheless 
precludes him from properly endorsing such a view. The result is not that 
Kant cannot remain neutral on the issue. It is that, if he does, then Kantian 




Before we proceed, it will be helpful to introduce some labels. Let Q-s be the 
question of whether discursive cognizers with other sensible forms are 
possible. And let Q-i be the question of whether discursive cognizers with 
other intellectual forms are possible. We saw in § that Kant thinks we cannot 
know the answer to Q-s. Undecidability is the view that we cannot know the 
answer to Q-i. Let Second-Order Undecidability be the view that we cannot 
know whether Undecidability is true. And let Second-Order Decidability be 
the view that we can know this. Equivalently (given that Contingency is off 
the table) Second-Order Undecidability is the view that we cannot decide 
between Undecidability and Necessity, while Second-Order Decidability is 
the view that we can. 
Is there anything to be said in favour of Second-Order Decidability and thus 
against Second-Order Undecidability? There is an important section in the 
Critique which is directly relevant to this question, namely the Fourth Section 
of the Antinomy of Pure Reason, entitled “The transcendental problems of 
pure reason, insofar as they absolutely must be capable of a solution” (A–
/B–). Precisely what Kant provides in this section is a criterion for 
whether an issue is decidable, or equivalently for whether a question is 
answerable. Kant writes: 
Transcendental philosophy has the special property that there is no 
question at all dealing with an object given by pure reason that is 
insoluble by this very same human reason; and that no plea of 
unavoidable ignorance and the unfathomable depth of the problem can 
release us from the obligation of answering it thoroughly and 
completely; for the very same concept that puts us in a position to ask the 
question must also make us competent to answer it, since the object is not 
encountered at all outside the concept. (A/B, our italics; cf. 
A/B) 
Roughly, a question is answerable if the sheer fact that we can ask it puts us 
in a position to answer it. Now this criterion serves only as a sufficient 
condition. Failure to satisfy it doesn’t in general make a question 
unanswerable. However, there is reason to think that, in the specific case of 
Q-s and Q-i, Kant’s criterion can serve as a necessary condition too. For if 




than whatever is accessible to us in the sheer posing of it would be required 
to answer it. But what could this be? To pose either question is already to 
exercise the understanding and invoke our concepts of cognitive forms. And 
it is clear that no exercise of sensibility, whether pure or empirical, could help 
us answer either question—in the one case because it is about the possibility 
of things’ being intuited in some quite different way, and in the other case 
because it is not about things’ being intuited at all. So if either Q-s or Q-i fails 
to satisfy Kant’s criterion, it is unanswerable. 
Given his commitment to undecidability about other sensible forms, Kant 
must hold that whatever is accessible to us in formulating Q-s does not put 
us in a position to determine whether other sensible forms are possible—he 
thinks that Q-s fails to satisfy his criterion and is thus unanswerable. If Q-i 
likewise fails to satisfy Kant’s criterion, then it is likewise unanswerable, which 
is to say that Undecidability holds. But if Q-i does satisfy Kant’s criterion, 
then it is answerable, which is to say that Necessity holds. 
This can seem to tell in favour of Second-Order Decidability and thus against 
Second-Order Undecidability. For surely we can know whether or not Q-i 
satisfies Kant’s criterion, in which case we can decide between Necessity and 
Undecidability. After all, Kant thinks this is true for Q-s—he thinks we can 
know that Q-s is a question about possibilities that exceed whatever is 
accessible to us merely in asking it. But this would be too quick. In general, 
to have a criterion is one thing, to be able to know whether something satisfies 
it quite another.25 And we have nothing as yet to guarantee that we can know 
whether Q-i satisfies Kant’s criterion. So, as yet, there is nothing here to 
motivate Second-Order Decidability. 
And in fact nothing here can motivate Second-Order Decidability. For what 
is at issue is whether the answer to Q-i lies, in Kant’s words, “outside the 
concept.” If we cannot answer Q-i, the reason for this must be that, even 
 
25 It is noteworthy that there is room for exegetical controversy concerning the application of 
this criterion to the very questions that Kant is concerned with in the broader context in 
which this section occurs, namely the questions that generate the four antinomies. Bird 
(: ch.) thinks that Kant thinks these questions are all unanswerable by his criterion; 





though Q-i is a question about concepts, its answer does lie “outside the 
concept”—either because it concerns concepts other than those involved in 
posing it or because it concerns possibilities about the concepts involved in 
posing it that exceed what is thereby accessible to us. But to ask whether this 
is the case is simply to ask the original question of whether Undecidability or 
Necessity holds—the second-order issue of whether Q-i satisfies Kant’s 
criterion collapses into the first-order issue about how to answer that 
question. For Necessity in effect just is the view that we can know that 
answering Q-i  appeals to no more than is accessible to us in posing it, namely 
our own intellectual forms—it just is the view that we can know that these 
forms are the forms of discursive understanding as such. And Undecidability 
just is the view that we cannot know these things. That is to say, precisely what 
is at issue between Undecidability and Necessity is whether or not Q-i  is a 
question that poses one of those “transcendental problems of pure reason” 
which, for the reason Kant gives, “absolutely must be capable of a solution.” 
There is no more guarantee here that we can tell whether or not Q-i satisfies 
Kant’s criterion than there is that we can bypass his criterion and tell straight 
off whether or not Q-i is answerable. 
What this shows is that Kant’s criterion for decidability does not rule out 
Second-Order Undecidability any more than it rules out (first-order) 
Undecidability or his commitment to undecidability regarding the possibility 
of other sensible forms. It thus remains open that Kant thought there was no 
way to settle which of Necessity or Undecidability is true. 
. Luminosity and Neutrality 
Second-Order Undecidability is the view that we cannot decide between 
Undecidability and Necessity. To endorse it would be to maintain a position 
of in principle neutrality between the two views. So does Kant endorse it? In 
this section we will argue that Kant could not in fact do so. But this is not 
because neutrality is not an option for him. It is because his views on 
philosophical knowledge constrain the form such neutrality can take. 
Our argument rests on the plausible claim that Kant would endorse a 
luminosity principle which states that whenever we can have philosophical 




Luminosity. We give reasons for thinking that Kant endorses it below. First we 
explain why endorsing the luminosity of any kind of knowledge precludes 
endorsing second-order undecidability concerning knowledge of that kind. 
Our talk of endorsement here is a place-holder for some generic relation to a 
claim that we cannot properly stand in without knowing the claim, for 
instance because knowing the claim is a constitutive norm of standing in the 
relation to the claim.26 Thus the reason that endorsing the luminosity of any 
kind of knowledge precludes endorsing second-order undecidability 
concerning knowledge of that kind is that luminosity and second-order 
undecidability are not jointly knowable. Together they form what Sorensen 
(: ) calls a “knowledge blindspot”—the claims themselves are 
consistent, but knowing them is not. 
Here is why. Take knowledge whether p as a case in point. Luminosity entails 
that, if we can know whether p, then we can know that we can. But that is as 
much as to say that, given luminosity, the first-order decidability of an issue 
entails the corresponding second-order decidability, or equivalently, that the 
second-order undecidability of an issue entails the corresponding first-order 
undecidability. Now assume that someone knows both luminosity and the 
second-order undecidability of some issue. Then, by following the reasoning 
we just sketched, they can come to know the corresponding first-order 
undecidability. But no-one can know both the first- and the second-order 
undecidability of an issue. For knowledge is factive and the latter says that the 
former cannot be known. Thus our assumption was false and necessarily so. 
No-one can know both luminosity and the second-order undecidability of 
any issue. Since endorsement requires knowledge, endorsing the former 
precludes endorsing the latter. 
So far this is a purely formal result. It has application to our topic on the 
assumption that the knowledge Necessity says we can have, namely 
knowledge that other intellectual forms are impossible, would be a case of 
philosophical knowledge. For this would mean that Philosophical Luminosity 
entails the following conditional: if Necessity is true, then we can know that 
it is true. Note that this holds regardless of whether or not Necessity is true 
and regardless of which view (if either) Kant endorses—all parties to our 
 




dispute can accept it. And it is enough to show that endorsement of 
Philosophical Luminosity precludes endorsement of Second-Order 
Undecidability. For Second-Order Undecidability entails that we cannot 
know that Necessity is true, which by the above conditional would entail that 
it is not true. Thus no one can know both Philosophical Luminosity and 
Second-Order Undecidability, because that would allow them to know that 
Necessity is not true (via the above conditional), which Second-Order 
Undecidability itself says cannot be known. Kant’s endorsement of 
Philosophical Luminosity would preclude his endorsing Second-Order 
Undecidability. 
So does Kant endorse Philosophical Luminosity? Timothy Williamson’s 
celebrated anti-luminosity argument begins by connecting luminosity to the 
view that we have “a cognitive home” in which “nothing is hidden from us... 
everything lies open to view” (: –). He continues: 
To deny that something is hidden is not to assert that we are infallible 
about it. Mistakes are always possible… The point is that, in our 
cognitive home, such mistakes are always rectifiable. Similarly, we are 
not omniscient about our cognitive home. We may not know the 
answer to a question simply because the question has never occurred to 
us. Even if something is open to view, we may not have glanced in that 
direction. Again, the point is that such ignorance is always removable. 
Kant’s account of philosophical knowledge exemplifies, remarkably closely, 
the one sketched by Williamson. Kant does not think we are infallible in 
philosophy. Indeed, he thinks that mistakes in the form of transcendental 
illusions are not only possible but natural (A/B, Avii). Nor does he 
think we are omniscient in philosophy. We may not know the answer to a 
question simply because it has never occurred to us, such as how synthetic a 
priori knowledge is possible (B, A/B, A; Prol.:). But, as we 
saw in the previous section, he clearly thinks that philosophy is our cognitive 
home, where mistakes are always rectifiable and ignorance is always removable 
(A–/B–). And Kant’s basic reason for this view is familiar: 
philosophy is our cognitive home because philosophical knowledge is a kind 





The view that philosophy is our cognitive home—that nothing in philosophy 
must remain hidden from us so that we can always remove ignorance and 
error—is in effect just the view that philosophical issues are always decidable, 
that we can know the answer to any philosophical question. It is not yet a 
statement of Philosophical Luminosity, the view that, if we can have 
philosophical knowledge, then we can know that we can have it. But we can 
close the gap by attending to the fact that Kant thinks of philosophy as our 
cognitive home because he thinks of philosophical knowledge as a form of self-
knowledge. He says, for instance: 
that such a system [the philosophy of pure reason] should not be too 
great in scope for us to hope to be able entirely to complete it, can be 
assessed in advance from the fact that our object is not the nature of 
things, which is inexhaustible, but the understanding, which judges 
about the nature of things, and this in turn only in regard to its a priori 
cognition, the supply of which, since we do not need to search for it 
externally, cannot remain hidden from us (A–/B) 
If the reason that we can always answer philosophical questions is that they 
have to do solely with the understanding and we do not have to search 
externally, the same will be true of questions concerning whether we can know 
the answers to philosophical questions. Otherwise put, if philosophical 
questions are answerable because they are in a certain way questions about 
ourselves, then questions about whether we can answer such questions will 
also be about ourselves in that very same way and so also be answerable. The 
same reasoning that motivates Kant’s view that philosophy is our cognitive 
home would also motivate him to endorse Philosophical Luminosity.27 
It only remains to be shown that the knowledge Necessity says we can have, 
namely knowledge that other intellectual forms are impossible, would be a 
case of philosophical knowledge. This assumption was required to show that 
no one can endorse both Philosophical Luminosity and Second-Order 
Undecidability. But the reasoning we have just outlined to support Kant’s 
endorsement of Philosophical Luminosity also makes clear why this should 
be true. For any such knowledge would be knowledge, of our own intellectual 
 




forms, that they are the forms of the discursive intellect as such, and hence 
would be knowledge of ourselves in just this crucial way. It would be a case of 
philosophical knowledge to which Philosophical Luminosity applied.28 
If Kant endorses Philosophical Luminosity, then, he is precluded from 
endorsing Second-Order Undecidability—he cannot endorse the view that 
we cannot decide between Undecidability and Necessity. Moreover, since the 
same reasoning applies to higher orders, nor can Kant endorse any higher-
order undecidability thesis. And this shows that Kant cannot remain neutral 
on the issue by endorsing Second-Order Undecidability or any higher-order 
undecidability thesis. 
What are the implications for the questions canvassed at the start of this essay? 
We have been motivated throughout by the recognition that Kant endorses 
an undecidability thesis about other sensible forms and the question of 
whether he endorses a symmetrical undecidability thesis about other 
intellectual forms. We have defended four main claims: first, that textual and 
systematic considerations do not decisively settle this question; second, that 
addressing the question will require a more general story about the nature and 
limits of our knowledge of mind; third, that Kant’s criterion for decidability 
does not rule out neutrality on our debate; and fourth, that given his 
commitment to Philosophical Luminosity, Kant is not entitled to remain 
neutral by endorsing the claim that we cannot know which of Undecidability 
or Necessity is true. 
Where does this leave us? There is a notable contrast between Kant’s explicit 
statement of undecidability about discursive cognizers with other sensible 
 
28 This can be helpfully related back to the discussion in the previous section. The reason why 
Undecidability and Necessity differ about whether or not our ignorance concerning the 
answer to Q-i is remediable is that they differ about whether we can know whether or not Q-
i is a question about ourselves in the relevant way. If Necessity holds, our ignorance 
concerning the answer to Q-i is remediable because we can know that our knowledge of our 
own intellectual forms is ipso facto knowledge of discursive intellectual forms as such. If 
Undecidability holds, our ignorance concerning the answer to Q-i is irremediable because we 
cannot know whether or not our knowledge of our own intellectual forms is ipso facto 
knowledge of discursive intellectual forms as such. Note again that our argument is 
independent of which of these views holds or which (if either) Kant endorses—we require 
only the claim that if Necessity holds, then Q-i is a question about ourselves in the relevant 




forms and his lack of explicit statement about whether we can know whether 
or not there could be discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms. And 
this, combined with the inability of other textual and systematic 
considerations to settle the question, might motivate the thought that Kant 
simply did not know which of Necessity or Undecidability was true. For it is 
scarcely credible that he didn’t even consider the issue. And it is hardly more 
credible that he did consider the issue, satisfied himself that he knew which 
was true, but did not see fit to tell us. After all, he did both of these things for 
the sensible case. If Kant is ignorant about whether we can know whether or 
not there could be discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms, then we 
have an explanation for the inability of textual and systematic considerations 
to settle the issue. 
But any such ignorance is constrained by the formal results above. For Kant 
is not entitled to endorse the claim that we cannot know which of Necessity 
or Undecidability is true, given his commitment to Philosophical Luminosity. 
So if it is Kant’s ignorance which explains the inability of textual and 
systematic considerations to settle this issue, it is not the kind of ignorance 
which Kant can express by endorsing the claim that we cannot know which 
of Necessity or Undecidability is true. It can only be a commitment to the 
claim that we do not know which is true. Such contingent ignorance is not 
precluded by the above results, for we could recognize that we do not know 
which is true whilst remaining open to the possibility of a consideration 
arising which will settle the issue. For the time being we can only wait and 
see. 
Yet there’s something unsatisfactory about appealing to Kant’s contingent 
ignorance to explain the inability of textual and systematic considerations to 
decide the matter. After all, just as Kant does not explicitly commit to either 
Necessity or Undecidability, neither does he explicitly state that he doesn’t 
know which of them is true. So appealing to Kant’s contingent ignorance does 
little better at explaining his taciturnity on this point. And more generally, as 




about contingent ignorance, or at least about self-conscious contingent 
ignorance, from the point of view of transcendental philosophy.29 
But there is another option. We have seen that Kant is not entitled to remain 
neutral on the issue by endorsing any higher-order undecidability thesis. In 
particular, he is not entitled to remain neutral by claiming to know that we 
cannot know which of Undecidability and Necessity is true. But this is 
because Philosophical Luminosity and Second-Order Undecidability cannot 
both be known. It is not because Philosophical Luminosity and Second-Order 
Undecidability cannot both be true. They can both be true. And that shows 
that someone could quite reasonably think, “Second-Order Undecidability 
probably holds. That is, we probably cannot in principle decide between 
Undecidability and Necessity. On pain of contradiction, I can never know 
that this is the case, given that I already know that Philosophical Luminosity 
holds. But still, I suspect that’s how it is!” Such a person might even suspect 
that undecidability goes ‘all the way up’. 
This is important because it shows that there is a way in which Kant could 
maintain a position of in principle neutrality on the question of whether 
Undecidability or Necessity is true, not by endorsing the claim that it is 
undecidable which of them is true, but by adopting some attitude towards 
that claim which is not precluded by a failure to know it, or by simply saying 
nothing at all on the issue. To remain neutral in this way would still be to 
maintain an asymmetry between sensibility and the understanding, since 
Kant is explicit that we cannot know whether discursive cognizers with other 
sensible forms are possible. But this asymmetry would merely take the form 
of there being a limit to the claims that Kant could endorse with respect to 
the understanding which did not have any counterpart with respect to 
sensibility. 
Some will see such humility as deeply Kantian. Kant, after all, expressly sets 
out to draw a boundary to our cognition and knowledge, and part of that 
project involves drawing upon modes of assent which are not undermined by 
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our being unable to know the claim in question.30 Others will think that 
silence is the inevitable result of attempting to express the incoherence of 
discursive cognizers with other intellectual forms and that the difference 
between endorsable undecidability and unendorsable neutrality is simply the 
natural result of the difference between thinking about different forms of 
sensing and thinking about different forms of thought. 
This suggests another way to resolve our puzzle. Kant does not explicitly state 
whether we can know whether or not discursive cognizers with other 
intellectual forms are possible. Nor are there textual or systematic 
considerations which decisively settle the question. If these observations 
suggest that Kant was neutral on the question, such neutrality may simply 
register Kant’s ignorance on the topic, combined with an openness to some 
consideration coming along which decides the matter. But they may also 
register, either instead or as well, not the endorsement of the claim that we 
cannot know which of Undecidability or Necessity is true, but a recognition, 
however inchoate, of the fact that any statement of such in principle neutrality 
can never be known, combined with a suspicion that it is nevertheless the 
truth of the matter. It may be that where endorsement gives out, we can only 
remain silent.   
 
30 See e.g. Bxxx and Kant’s account of different modes of Fürwahrhalten at A–/B–
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